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The recent Iranian election fiasco has been a blessing in disguise for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His reelection was confirmed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the vote count was ratified by the Council of Guardians, and the presidential oath of office was taken in front of a majority of parliamentarians. Consequently, while those officials may object to his actions, their ability to counter them is limited. If Ahmadinejad fails, so, too, will they for having sanctioned his authority.

But in order to hold any public position in the future -- and he can be elected to a third, nonconsecutive, presidential term -- Ahmadinejad needs to regain the confidence of Iran's people, because he cannot count on another clerically engineered miracle.

Sources in Iran indicate that, faced with mounting demands of loyalty from the hardliners who brought him back to power, Ahmadinejad is instead exploiting their public weaknesses and internal schisms to assert his independence. Yes, hardliners did prevail in their demands that First Vice President Esfandiar Mashaie step down, after reports surfaced of his being conciliatory towards Israel. But Ahmadinejad promptly reappointed Mashaie to the rank of presidential chief of staff, despite protests from Khamenei and other fundamentalist clerics.

When nominating his new cabinet of ministers, Ahmadinejad touted their secular university-based qualifications as an "advantage," in clear contrast to the seminary-based learning of the clerics opposing him. Those selections sought to rebuild ties with Iran's intellectual and public elites. He focused on inclusiveness as well by appointing three women, remarking: "Why shouldn't women be in the Cabinet. . . . Who says women aren't better?" Their selection undercut yet another important segment of the opposition, casting his political rivals among both hardliners and reformers -- including former Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi -- as misogynists. Knowing that fundamentalist parliamentarians may try to block confirmation of cabinet ministers, Ahmadinejad has affirmed that the executive branch will not bow to the legislative one.

Yet, to restore his compromised position, Ahmadinejad has to do more than just outmaneuver his opponents. His appointees and he know they must successfully redress the economic mismanagement from his first term as president that saw inflation rise from 11 percent to 28 percent, unemployment rise from 11 percent to 12.5 percent, and GDP fall from 6.3 percent to an estimated 4.9 percent. Despite being the world's fifth-largest crude oil exporter, Iran imports 40 percent of the fuel utilized by Iranians due to limited refining capacity. Sanctions under consideration by G-8 nations will target those imports, while making Western trade with Iran nearly impossible by preventing its insurance and restricting its shipment.

Failure to revitalize the economy will snuff out any hopes of future political office for Ahmadinejad. So he is restructuring Iran's national budget in line with realistic export revenues for crude oil and natural gas. Ensuring that Iran is no longer dependent on refined petroleum imports is another priority, with refining capacity being expanded rapidly to ensure Iran will become self-sufficient by 2012. To counter the effectiveness of current and future sanctions, Ahmadinejad's government is also enhancing export of electronic appliances to other developing countries, especially via overland and Persian Gulf trade.

Even disturbing behaviors seemingly directed at the West (particularly the U.S.) and Israel -- like selecting Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, who is wanted by Interpol for terrorism, as defense minister -- are not erratic, but calculated. Within Iran, Vahidi's appointment consolidates Ahmadinejad's control over the military and the revolutionary guard with its Basij auxiliaries, a pragmatic move that enhances his ability to suppress opposition from fundamentalists, moderates, and even the general public.

Some worry that Ahmadinejad subscribes to violent millenarianism, allegedly linked to the Anjoman-e Hojjatiye, or Association of God's Proof. Hojjatiye, however, are part of the quietist Shiite tradition, rather than the activist or political current. Members of the Hojjatiye oppose velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of jurists institutionalized by the first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who himself spearheaded the activist Shiites. But neither the quietist nor the activist groups believe in purposefully triggering an apocalypse. Moreover, Ahmadinejad is pragmatically relocating his own political base away from activist and quietist clerics, and toward secular radicals.

Ahmadinejad has moved to bring the Atomic Energy Organization more directly under presidential control as well. By appointing Aki Akbar Salehi, Iran's former representative to the IAEA, as its new director, Ahmadinejad is attempting to reduce the Supreme Leader's say over that organization. Ahmadinejad's new administration has already partially cooperated with the IAEA, permitting expanded monitoring of nuclear facilities. Uranium enrichment has been slowed down for both political and practical reasons. These recent actions reflect a realization, according to Iranian officials, that at least appearing to seek compromise is necessary for Ahmadinejad's government to succeed.

To surmount his self-created pariah status in the West, Ahmadinejad also needs cooperation from other nations. The reappointment of Manouchehr Mottaki as foreign minister is one such calculated step toward possible engagement. It ensures that Iran will continue to be represented by a diplomat familiar to EU government officials, who regard him as a pragmatist. Mottaki joins Mashaie and other foreign policy realists in the presidential administration.

Ahmadinejad and his administration may never be well-disposed toward an active partnership with Western nations, especially not with the U.S. Yet in order to ensure his own political effectiveness and legacy, Ahmadinejad may extend compromises on atomic inspection, antiterrorism, and even Middle East peace in exchange for Iran's inclusion within the global economic community. Given his past words and deeds, however, the question remains whether those offers will be legitimate and constructive.

Although often bombastic, Ahmadinejad is more a wily and pragmatic politician than an ideologue, and he is now charting an independent course because it benefits him. Whether his actions will pay off for the Iranian people and for Iran's international standing, however, remains to be seen.